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Australia's Federal Courts:
Their Origins, Structure
and Jurisdiction
Mary Crock and Ronald McCallum *
I. INTRODUCTION

The primary aim of this Paper is to explain for a North American
audience the origin, structure, and jurisdictions of Australia's network of
federal courts.' Together with the companion papers from America and
Canada, the goal of this Paper is to set the scene for a more detailed
examination of the federal judicial systems in the three countries. Readers will
be able to draw out for themselves the similarities and differences between the
various regimes. Nevertheless, in trying to capture the essence of the
Australian system, mention will be made on occasion of how the Australian
approach varies from that taken by the two federations with whom we share
so much of our cultural and legal heritage.
To recount this story, it is necessary to spend a little time on Australia's
historical background and on our colonial antecedents. As the operation of the
federal courts in the three countries depends upon the legislative powers of
their federal governments, it is necessary to examine the constitutional division
of powers between the Commonwealth or federal government and the state
governments.
Australia was settled by Europeans toward the close of the 18th century
in 1788. On January 1, 1901, the Australian Constitution, which originated
as an act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom,' came into force. For
almost a century, Australians have grappled with the relationship between
federal courts and federal jurisdiction on the one hand, and on the other, the
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** B. Juris, LLB [Hons], Monash; LLM, Queen's Canada; Blake Dawson Waldron
Professor in Industrial Law, University of Sydney. We wish to thank Mr. Mark Endacott, Mr.
Ian Nicolson, and Mr. David Tritton for aiding us with the research for this paper. We also wish
to thank Ms. Aimee Attard for proofing and formatting this paper. Finally, special thanks are
due to Professor Herbert A. Johnson for giving us this opportunity to comment upon the
development and structure of Australia's system of federal courts.
1. See generally J. CRAWFORD, AUSTRALIAN COURTS OF LAw (3d ed. 1993). Throughout
this paper, we refer constantly to this source, and we wish to acknowledge our indebtedness to
this book. Persons wishing to read a detailed and thorough account of Australia's system of
courts could do no better than to read this scholarly little volume.
2. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, 63 & 64 Viet., ch. 12 [hereinafter
AUSTL. CONST.].
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jurisdiction of the state supreme courts, whose origins antedate Australian
federation. Ninety-four years after federation, despite a few problems, the
federal and state courts work harmoniously together. This is due in the main
to a cooperative approach by state and federal judges and governments.
In 1903 and in 1904, the Commonwealth Parliament established the High
Court of Australia3 and the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and
Arbitration.4 The High Court is Australia's highest curial body. It is the
arbiter of the Australian Constitution, and it is the final court of appeal on all
questions of Australian law. It not only hears appeals from federal courts, but
it also is the final court of appeal from the judgments of the state courts. The
Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration was Australia's first
labor court. Over the last nine decades, it has undergone many changes.
These alterations speak much about the Australian federation.
Unlike the United States of America, upon federation the Commonwealth
Parliament did not establish a separate network of Australian courts. Rather,
it reposed federal jurisdiction in state courts. This worked well enough.
However, by the 1960s the increased responsibilities of the Commonwealth
government meant that there was a growing need for a federal judiciary below
the High Court level. The move for a centralized federal curia bore fruit in
1977,1 when the Federal Court of Australia opened its doors. The breadth of
jurisdiction reposed in this court has made it one of Australia's most
significant tribunals. Its judgments have reshaped Australia's legal landscape.
The Paper continues with a short examination of the Family Court of
Australia, which for two decades has endeavored to settle the legal issues
arising from marital breakdown. It concludes with a brief discussion of
possible future directions in what has become the vast and complex arena of
Australian federal law.
II. GENESIS OF A NATION
A. Uniformity Born of a PlannedBeginning
There are many striking similarities among the three countries represented
at this conference. The United States, Canada, and Australia all are nations
created through conquest and that have substantial size and natural wealth. All
are federations dominated by English-speaking populations, sharing some
cultural roots and legal traditions. Canada and Australia are part of the British
Commonwealth, with relatively small, highly urbanized populations clustered
around the habitable edges of their respective land masses. They share a

3. Judiciary Act 1903 Commonwealth of Australia [hereinafter "(Cth)"].
4. Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act'1904 (Cth).
5. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).
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similar, sometimes ambivalent relationship of dependence with the superpower
that is the United States of America.
To understand the provenance of any legal system, however, it often is
the unique aspects of a country's history that are decisive. 6 Of the three
countries, Australia stands apart for the homogeneity of its laws and legal
institutions and for the central focus of its governments in the federal capital
of Canberra. While there are regional differences in culture and outlook,
these are subtle in comparison with the variety that exists among the Canadian
provinces or American states. Indeed, in some respects, Australia is more a
unitarian system than a confederation of different states and territories.
Australia's internal homogeneity owes much to its beginning as a series
of penal colonies established to service the needs of its mother country,
England. The first penal colony was established at Sydney in 1788. The
earliest settlements were unambiguously English. Britain provided Australia's
first involuntary settlers and her later free settlers. England was looked to as
a source of law and authority. Unlike either America or Canada, Australia
was settled in an ordered fashion, by people with more or less the same ethnic
and cultural background.
The homogeneity of Australia's earliest settlers was reflected in the
colonies' firm sense of their identity as Anglo-Saxon communities. This was
manifest in the distrust shown to peoples of other cultures, whether aboriginal
or Asian. Control of the racial composition of the colonies was high on the
agenda of the earliest legislatures. 7 One of the first initiatives of the new
Federal Parliament in 1901 was to give a legislative basis to the government's
White Australia Policy.'
Fundamental to the uniformity of Australia's early legal regime was the
settlers' characterization of the country as a terra nullius, or a land without
settled laws. This meant that Britain's common law and legislative heritage
could be adopted without any attempt to accommodate or even recognize the
laws and customs of the indigenous peoples.9 Unlike the situation in Canada,
there was no other major colonizing power present in the country to
compromise the supremacy of the British laws.

6. On the colonial history of the law and the judicial system in Australia, see ALEX C. CAsTLEGAL HIsToRY (1982); CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 6-57; Herbert A. Johnson, Historical and Constitutional Perspectives on Cross-vesting of Court
Jurisdiction,19 MELB. U. L. REa. 45, 49 (1993).
7. See M. WILLARD, A HIsTORY OF THE WHITE AUSTRALIA POLICY TO 1920 119 (2d ed.
1967); Mary E. Crock, Administrative Law and Immigration Control in Australia 22-24 (1994)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Melbourne School of Law).
8. See Immigration Restriction Act 1901 (Cth). This Act was the 17th law passed by the
Australian Parliament in its first year.
9. In fact, Australia had been inhabited for centuries before white settlement by peoples with
very developed systems of laws and customs. However, the propriety of the assumption that the
country had been terra nullius as a matter of international law was not questioned by the courts
until 1992. See infra section IV.D.
LES, AUSTRALIAN
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Australia's penal beginnings probably slowed the grant of legislative
powers to the colonies and delayed the establishment of a system of civil
courts. However, it meant that when a degree of independence was granted
to the fledgling colony, there was a centralized albeit occasionally corrupt
system for maintaining law and order onto which a judicial scheme could be
engrafted.
B. The Reception of English Law
As a colony of Britain, the common law and the rules of equity, at least
to a certain extent, were deemed to have been received in Australia from time
of settlement. 1 Where appropriate to the new colony, some English statutory
law also was received by implication, although precisely which laws and at
what dates was sometimes unclear."
To clarify the jurisprudential situation for Australia's early courts, English
common law and statutory law were formally extended to the Eastern
Australian colonies on July 25, 1828, the date specified in the Australian
Courts Act 1828,12 passed in respect of what was then the colony of New
South Wales. The colonies of Tasmania, Victoria, Queensland, and at
federation, the Australian Capital Territory were carved out of New South
Wales and were deemed to have adopted the English laws at the same date."
When the colonies of Western Australia and South Australia were founded in
1829 and
1836 respectively, English laws were formally introduced there as
4
well.'
The reception acts did not completely dispose of the issue of the status for
the colonies of "imported" British statute law. There remained the question
of when the colonial legislatures could amend such statutes. A distinction was
made between general English statutes that might apply to the colonies and the
"paramount" legislation that was created by the British Parliament for the
specific purpose of the colonies. The former could be amended by local
legislatures while the latter could not. 5 Once again, the uncertainty of the
situation in Australia was addressed through the passage by the United
Kingdom Parliament of various principle pieces of enabling legislation: the
Australian Courts Act 1828, the Australian Constitutions Act 1850, the
Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865, and the Commonwealth of Australia
Constitution Act 1900. These left the paramount legislation concentrated in

10. See CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 5-6.
11. See id.at 16.
12. Australian Courts Act 1828 (UK).
13. See Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 (NSW) § 5; Constitution Act 1975 (Vict.) § 3;
Supreme Court Act 1868 (Qld.) § 20.
14. See Interpretation Act 1918 (WA) § 43; and Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA) § 48.
15. See CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 16 (discussing Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865

§2 (UK)).
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three areas: appeals to the Privy Council, admiralty and prize law, and certain
areas of evidence and foreign law.' 6
The fact that English statutes applied across the range of Australian
colonies helped to ensure a common jurisprudential base for the local courts
and Parliaments. Uniformity of law between the colonies was further
encouraged by the court hierarchy itself and the central role played by the
Privy Council in the review of statutory and judgemade law.
The express nature of the Australian colonies' adoption of English law
stands in contrast to the more irregular and ad hoe extension of British laws
and judicial systems to the colonies in North America between 1607 and
1753. 1' The other significant factor for Australia during the crucial period
of first settlement, however, was the state of the English law and the
prevailing legal philosophies. By the early 19th century, English laws had
evolved into a relatively uniform corpus of material. More importantly,
William Blackstone's theories were in their ascendancy. As Johnson points
out, the notion of parliamentary sovereignty was never challenged in Australia
as it was in Canada and the United States. 8 Under the Westminster system
of government, uniformity also was encouraged by the central role of the
monarch. 9
C. The Colonial Court System
Between 1788 and 1823, Australia's courts were essentially military-styled
tribunals. In the colonies of New South Wales and Tasmania there were
criminal courts with a procedure akin to a court martial and civil courts
established under the prerogative.'
In 1823 Supreme Courts were established in both of these colonies, and lower courts were created in keeping with
the English hierarchy of judicial establishments. When the new colonies were
founded the same scheme of courts was introduced or adopted in due course.
As Crawford notes, Victoria is the only state that in any way entrenches or
guarantees the existence of its judicial system in its state constitution.2' Even
here, it is doubtful that the measures taken to guarantee the independence and
16. Id. As Crawford notes, the process for Australia of abolishing appeals to the Privy
Council from the State Supreme Courts and from the High Court, was long and complicated.
For further details, see infra section 4.4.
17. See Johnson, supra note 6, at 49; Herbert A. Johnson, English Statutes in ColonialNew
York, 58 NEw YORK HIST. 277 (1977).
18. Johnson, supra note 6.
19. Id.
20. See CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 24; see also Enid M. Campbell, The Royal Prerogative
to Create Colonial Courts:A Study of the ConstitutionalFoundationsof the JudicialSystem in
New South Wales, 1788-1823, 4 SYDNEY L. REV. 343 (1964).
21. See CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 24-26. The constitutions of Tasmania and New South
Vales are silent on the matter of the judiciary, while those of Queensland, South Australia and
Western Australia deal only with the tenure of Supreme Court judges.
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jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would be binding on a state legislature bent
on abolishing the court.22 It is interesting to note that jury trials in either
criminal or civil matters were not introduced into New South Wales until the
1840s, owing in part to its status as a penal colony. South Australia and
Western Australia, which were first settled by free settlers soon established
trial by jury.
Before federation in 1901 there was no uniform system for appealing
decisions of local supreme courts. Appeals could be made in most colonies
to a Local Court of Appeals constituted by the Governor-in-Council. In
addition, appeals from the supreme courts could be made by leave or as of
right to the Privy Council. Neither avenue of appeal proved satisfactory.
Local appeal mechanisms lacked quality, and the Privy Council was rendered
inaccessible to most litigants by the cost and delays involved. The lack of a
central, indigenous, appellate court is said to be one of the factors that
encouraged the move toward federation. It is no coincidence that the framers
of the federal constitution assured a right of appeal from the state supreme
courts to the High Court.' Since the abolition of rights to appeal to the
Privy Council,24 the High Court has been the only refuge of appeal from
decisions of the state supreme courts.

22. See CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 24. State constitutions in Australia differ from their
federal counterpart in that they can be amended without a referendum. Victoria's constitution
has been amended so as to prescribe the manner and form of any change to § 85 (the provision
dealing with the status and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court). However, Crawford points out
that "manner and form" amendments may only be binding on future Parliaments where they
relate to the constitution, powers or procedures of the Parliament.
23. See AuSTL. CONST. § 73.
24. Australia Act 1986 (Cth), § 9; Australia Act 1986 (UK), § 9. For further details see infra
section IV.D.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol46/iss5/5

6

Crock and McCallum: Australia's Federal Courts: Their Origins, Structure and Jurisdic

1995]

AUSTRALIA'S FEDERAL COURTS

III. THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION
AND ITS DIVISION OF POWERS

A. The Making of the Constitution
The Australian Constitution is a creature not of an Australian Parliament
but of the British Imperial Parliament. Nevertheless, for the most part, the
document itself was drafted in Australia by delegates from the various colonies
who met at four conventions between 1890 and 1898.25
It is significant that the drafters of the Australian Constitution had the
constitutions of Canada and the United States as examples or models from
which to work. Both of these constitutions grappled in different ways with the
challenge of defining the relationship between an overriding federal body and
the constituent states of the federation. Broadly speaking, the United States
Constitution purported to defer to the states by setting out a rather modest list
of federal powers. Any residual powers were left impliedly in the hands of
the states.26 By way of contrast, Canada chose to spell out the legislative
powers of its Federal Parliament in a much more exhaustive fashion.27 For
the benefit of the provinces, a similarly extensive list was included of the
powers vested exclusively in their parliaments. 28 The result distinguished
very clearly between the Provincial and federal spheres of influence. The
predominance of the federal government was evident, however, in Part V of
the British North America Act, now the Canadian Constitution Act. This gave
the Governor-General power to appoint and recall Lieutenant-Governors and
to disallow Provincial legislation.
The drafters of the Australian Constitution took something from the
American and Canadian models. Like Canada, they opted for a rather
extensive listing of the legislative powers to be vested in the federal Parliament. However, they declined to give a similar constitutional basis to the
states' law-making authority. In this regard the drafters were clearly more
attracted to the American notion of leaving the residual, unspecified powers
to the states.
Ironically, the two constitutions that sought to limit federal influence in
this way are the ones where the states' power has waned most dramatically.
The Canadian Provinces, on the other hand, have maintained and even

25. CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 25.
26. As Crawford observes, at the time of the Convention debates in Australia, the potential
for expansion of the rather minimalist powers in the American Constitution was not understood.
See James Crawford, The Legislative Power of the Commonwealth, in THE CONVENTION
DEBATES 1891-1898: COMMENTARIES, INDICES AND GUIDE 113 (G. Craven ed., 1986).
27. The Canadian Constitution was enacted into law by the British Parliament in 1867. See
Constitution Act 1867 (UK) § 91. This statute was formerly titled the British North America Act.
28. CAN. CONST. § 92.
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enhanced their standing at the expense of their federal government. In the
United States and Australia, the judiciary's interpretation of the respective
constitutions seems to be far removed from what the framers of those
constitutions intended for both countries.
Section 51 of the Australian Constitution sets out for the federal
Parliament thirty-nine heads of legislative power. These cover the areas
thought essential for the operation of Australia as a nation: direct and indirect
taxation,29 borrowing money on the public credit of the Commonwealth,30
defense,3 immigration and emigration,3" naturalization and aliens,33 external affairs,34 and matters going to ensure a uniform commercial system.3
In addition, the drafters included areas where consistency among the states was
thought to be desirable. The federal Parliament was therefore given power to
37
36
legislate in respect of marriage and divorce; aged and invalid pensions;
trade and commerce between the states;3" conciliation and arbitration for the
prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of
any one state;3 9 post, telegraph and telephone and other like services;40 and
trading corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth.4'
The Convention debates make it clear that it was the intention of the
drafters of the Australian Constitution to preserve and protect from federal
intervention the domestic affairs of the states. The first of Sir Henry Parkes'
four resolutions in 1891 was:
That the powers and privileges and territorial rights of the several existing
colonies shall remain intact, except in respect of such surrenders as may
be agreed upon as necessary and incidental to the power and authority of
the National Federal Government.42
B. The High Court as Interpreterof the Constitution

29. Ausm. CONST. § 51(ii).

30. Id. § 51(iv).
31. Id. § 51(vi).
32. Id. § 51(xxvii).

33. Id.§ 51(xix).
34. AuSTL. CONST. § 51(xxix).

35. Id.§ 51(iii) (currency); Id. § 51(iv) (weights and measures); Id. § 51(vi) (bills of
exchange).
36. Id. §§ 51(xxi) and (xxii).
37. Id. § 51(xxiii). This power was supplemented in 1946 by a power to legislate in respect
of other types of pensions. See id. § 51(xxiiiA).

38. Id. § 51(i).
39. Ausm. CONST. § 51(xxxv).
40. Id. § 51(v).

41. Id. § 51(xx). The power also extends to foreign corporations.
42. AUSTL. CONST. DEBATES 23 (Sydney 1891).
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The two chief architects of the Constitution-Griffith and Barton-were
among the first appointments to the new High Court in 1901. In the early
years of the new nation, their interpretation of the document they had created
left in no doubt their belief in the inviolability of state sovereignty.43 In
interpreting the Constitution, it is also no coincidence that the early High
Court took some interest in parallel developments in the constitutional
jurisprudence of the United States. As Professor Zines points out, however,
the doctrine of state autonomy developed by the High Court was one that the
judges implied from their notion of how a federation should operate.' It was
not one that was immediately apparent from the text of the Constitution. For
example, while the first head of power in section 51 stipulates that the Federal
Parliament's power to legislate is limited to matters regarding trade and
commerce between the states, at least nine of the remaining thirty-eight powers
could allow for the regulation of aspects of intrastate trade.4' When the High
Court turned its attention more to the text of the Constitution, it was almost
inevitable that judicial respect for the integrity and autonomy of state powers
would decline.
The turning point in Australia was the decision of the High Court in
Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd.46 In that
case, the High Court adopted a much more legalistic, almost literal approach
to the Constitution than had been apparent in earlier cases. It deliberately
eschewed implied doctrines on the basis that such notions belong more
properly to the political arena than to statutory interpretation. The powers
conferred on the Federal Parliament were to be interpreted on their face,
allowing for historical developments that might not have been envisaged by the
founding fathers.
Because the Australian Constitution confers no express legislative powers
on the States, the High Court has not been forced to engage in any sort of
balancing exercise in determining the extent of federal and state jurisdiction.
Inevitably, curial interpretation of section 51 has seen a gradual growth in the
range of matters regulated by federal legislation. For Commonwealth
legislation to be valid, the federal Parliament need only rely on one head of
power. If one placitum of section 51 is relevant, it is not pertinent that the

43. See, e.g., Attorney-General v. Brewery Employee Union, 6 C.L.R. 469, 503 (1908) (per
Griffith C.J.); Peterswald v. Bartley, I C.L.R. 497, 507 (1904) (per Griffith C.J., Barton and
O'Connor JJ.). Both cases are discussed by CRAWFORD, supra note 26, at 114-15.
44. See LESLIE ZINES, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE COMMONWEALTH 87 (1991).
45. See, e.g., AUSTL. CONST. § 51(iii) (bounties on production or export of goods); id.
§ 51(xiv) (insurance); id. § 51(xv) (weights and measures); id. § 51(xvi) (bills of exchange); id.
§ 51(xvii) (bankruptcy and insolvency); id. § 51(xviii) (copyrights and patents); id. § 51(xx)
(corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth); id. § 51(xxxv) (conciliation and
arbitration). On this point, see also CRAWFORD supra note 26, at 116.
46. 28 C.L.R. 129 (1920).
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legislation is riding roughshod over a state Parliament that had purported to
regulate the matter in question.
The extent to which the High Court has expanded the scope of the
Commonwealth's powers is evident in the use made of the corporations power
in section 51(xx). This placitum has been relied on as the basis for controlling47
matters as diverse as restrictive trade practices including secondary boycotts
and legislation aimed at the protection of the environment.
The most striking example of the manner in which the High Court has
given a broad reading of federal heads of power has been its interpretation of
the External Affairs power. Under section 51(xxix) of the Australian
Constitution, the Australian government is empowered to legislate with respect
to "external affairs." Over the last dozen years, the High Court has held that
where the Australian government signs an international treaty, the Australian
Parliament may pass laws to give affect to the treaty. In the Koowarta case49
of 1982, the High Court held by majority that the Parliament could enact laws
prohibiting racial discrimination throughout the nation in order to give affect
to international conventions that outlawed this form of discrimination. 0 In
the following year, the Court again by majority handed down its decision in
the Tasmanian Dams case. 5' Federal legislation that prohibited the building
of a dam in the State of Tasmania on environmental grounds was upheld as a
valid exercise of the external affairs power. This was because the Australian
52
government was a signatory to conventions relating to the environment.
Prior to these decisions, racial discrimination and environmental matters fell
squarely within state responsibilities. These High Court precedents have been
regarded as controversial and they have given rise to much academic
literature. 3 In a series of subsequent decisions, however, the High Court has
continued to adhere to this broad reading of the external affairs power.54 In
47. See Actors & Announcers Equity Ass'n v. Fontana Films Pty. Ltd., 150 C.L.R. 169
(1982); Strickland v. Rockla Pipes Ltd., 124 C.L.R. 468 (1971).
48. See Commonwealth v. Tasmania, 158 C.L.R. 1 (1983).
49. Koowarta v. Bjelke-Peterson, 153 C.L.R. 168 (1982).
50. Id.; see also Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth); International Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination. This Convention was adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations in 1965. Australia ratified this Convention in 1975.
51. Commonwealth v. Tasmania, 158 C.L.R. 1 (1983).
52. Id. The Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage was
adopted by UNESCO in 1972 and was ratified by Australia in 1974.
53. See H.P. Lee, The High Court and the External Affairs Power, in AUSTRALIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES 60 (H.P. Lee & G. Winterton eds., 1992); LESLIE ZINES, THE
HIGH COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (3d ed. 1992); James Crawford, The Constitutionand the
Environment, 13 SYDNEY L. REV. 11 (1991); Mary E. Crock, Federalism and the External
Affairs Power, 14 MELB. U. L. REV. 238 (1985); J.T. Ludeke, The External Affairs Power;
Another Provincefor Law and Order?35 J. OF INDIAN. REL. 453 (1993); D.R. Rothwell, The
High Court and the ExternalAffairs Power:A Considerationof its Outer and Inner Limits, 15
ADEL. L. REv. 209 (1993).
54. See Polyukhovich v. Commonwealth, 172 C.L.R. 501 (1991); Horta v. Commonwealth,
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reliance on this power, the Australian Parliament has enacted wide-reaching
labor legislation 5 as well as laws prohibiting
direct and indirect discrimina7
56
tion on the grounds of sex and disability.
In the same way, the aliens power (section 51(xix)) has been upheld as a
basis for legislation mandating the detention of certain illegal migrants58 and
allowing for the deportation of long-term permanent residents.59 In both of
these cases, it is doubtful that the High Court would have upheld similar
legislation affecting citizens of Australia.'
In practical terms, the other factor determining the distribution of power
between the state and federal governments in Australia has been the fiscal
arrangements set out in the Constitution. The collection and distribution of
revenue is the preserve of the Commonwealth government. The states have
attempted on various occasions to avoid the prohibition on the levying of state
taxes. However, they are constitutionally dependent on the federal government for their financial survival. 6
The end result of the courts' interpretation of section 51 of the Constitution is a Federal Parliament endowed with extensive legislative powers. If the
framers of the Constitution intended the states to be the primary repositories
of legislative powers affecting everyday life in Australia, the reverse is now
the case: it is the Commonwealth that calls the tune.
IV. THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

A. The Establishmentof the High Court of Australia
The High Court of Australia sits at the apex of the Australian judicial
system.62 It is therefore appropriate to begin commentary on the Australian
123 A.L.R. 1 (1994); Queensland v. Commonwealth, 167 C.L.R. 232 (1989); Richardson v.
Forestry Comm'n, 164 C.L.R. 261 (1988).
55. Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth).
56. Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth).
57. Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth).
58. See Chu Kheng Lim v. Minister for Immigration, Local Gov't and Ethnic Affairs, 176
C.L.R. 1 (1992). This case is discussed in Mary E. Crock, ClimbingJacobs Ladder: The High
Court and the AdministrativeDetentionof Asylum Seekers in Australia, 15 SYDNEY L. REV. 338
(1993).
59. See Nolan v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs, 165 C.L.R. 178 (1989).
60. These cases highlight the absence in Australia of a legislated Bill of Rights. On this point,
see JUSTICE MURRAY R. WILCOX, AUSTRALIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS? (1993) and Gerry Ferguson, The Impact of an EntrenchedBill of Rights: The CanadianExperience, 16 MONASH U. L.
REV. 211 (1990).
61. See Cheryl Saunders, Government Borrowing in Australia, 17 MELB. U. L. REV. 187
(1989).
See generally, D.W. JAMES, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FINANCIAL RELATIONS IN
AUSTRALIA (1992). Note that the Financial Agreement Act 1994 (Cth) now governs the Loan
Council. This statute replaces the Financial Agreement Act 1927 (Cth).
62. For a recent description of the operations and jurisdiction of the High Court of Australia,
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federal court structure by detailing the powers and jurisdiction of this court.
The High Court is, of course, the final arbiter on all aspects of the Australian
Constitution. It also is the final court of appeal from the lower federal courts.
Unlike the Supreme Court of the United States, the Australian High Court is
the final court of appeal from the state courts as well. Accordingly, like the
Supreme Court of Canada, it can unify the common law of Australia.
The relevant provisions of the Australian Constitution detail some aspects
of the operations of the High Court, but in other areas the constitution is either
silent or leave it to the Commonwealth Parliament to fill in the gaps. Section
71 of the Australian Constitution provides that the judicial power of the
Commonwealth of Australia shall be vested in a federal supreme court that is
to be known as the High Court of Australia. While the Constitution outlines
the Court's appellate jurisdiction 3 and most aspects of its original jurisdiction, 6' it does not actually create the Court. Instead, section 71 provides that
Parliament may establish the court and that it shall be comprised of a chief
justice and at least two other justices.' In 1903, after some debate,' the
Commonwealth Parliament passed legislation creating the court,67 which was
constituted by a chief justice and two justices. In 1905, two further justices
were appointed. In 1912 the court, reached its present size of a chief justice
and six other justices.
Section 72 of the Constitution provides for the appointment and security
of tenure of judges of the High Court and of all other federal judges. They
are appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of the Executive Council
(that is, by Cabinet), and they can only be removed on grounds of misbehavior
or incapacity. A removal vote must be passed by both houses of the
Commonwealth Parliament. Originally section 72 required federal judges to
be appointed for life. In 1977, however, this section was altered by a
constitutional amendment allowing appointments to be made until a retirement
age of seventy years. Parliament is given the capacity to specify a lower
retirement age, but it has not done so in relation to the High Court and
accordingly seventy is the present age of retirement for High Court justices.
Ever since 1849, there have been calls for the establishment of a single
court of appeal for all of the Australian colonies.6 Indeed, the drafters of
see CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 178-98.

63. See AUSTL. CONST. §§ 73-74.
64. See id. §§ 75-76.
65. Id. § 71.
66. See J.M. BENNETT, KEYSTONE OF THE FEDERAL ARCH: A HISTORICAL MEMOIRE OF THE
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA TO 1980 12-20 (1980).
67. Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).
68. An appellate court was first recommended in 1849 by a Privy Council Committee chaired
by Earl Gray. In 1853, a Constitutional Committee of the New South Wales Legislative Council,
which was chaired by Wentworth, also urged the creation of an appeal court. See JOHN QUICK
& ROBERT R. GARRAN, THE ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION OF THE AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH, 85, 91 (1901).
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the Constitution believed that an Australian court of appeal was an essential
ingredient of the federation.69 As has been shown, the High Court carries
out this task. Before detailing the appellate and original jurisdiction of the
High Court, however, a few words must be written on its role as final arbiter
on the Constitution.
B. ConstitutionalAdjudication
One of the rather strange silences in the Constitution relates to the
capacity of the High Court to engage in constitutional adjudication through the
process of judicial review. Australia inherited its parliamentary system from
Great Britain. In England, where there is no written constitution, the
Parliament is supreme and the courts do not have the power to strike down
legislation. Nowhere in the Australian Constitution is it expressly stated that
the High Court possesses the power to invalidate federal or state statutes that
are contrary to the Australian Constitution. For that matter, the Constitution
does not state that the Court may invalidate state legislation that is contrary to
a state constitution. James Thomson has made a study of the constitutional
debates on this matter, and he concludes that the delegates undoubtedly
assumed that the High Court would possess the power to invalidate unconstitutional legislation.7" He then examines the text of the Constitution and
concludes that, although some provisions may imply judicial review by the
High Court, none clearly grants this power to the Court."
Nevertheless, since its establisiment, the High Court has struck down
federal and State legislation that is unconstitutional. It is the arbiter of the
Constitution, and just like the Supreme Courts of Canada and the United
States, its decisions have shaped Australian political and social life.
Above," we saw how the High Court has given a broad interpretation
to the heads of federal power that are set out in section 51 of the Constitution.
In recent decisions, the High Court has begun to draw implications from the
constitution. The Australian Constitution possesses neither an American Bill
of Rights nor a Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. However, the
High Court has signaled it will draw implications from the Constitution to
protect basic rights where appropriate.
69. BENNETT, supra note 66, at 5-11.
70. J.A. Thomson, ConstitutionalAuthority for Judicial Review: A Contributionfrom the
Framersof the AustralianConstitution, in THE CONVENTION DEBATES 1891-1898: COMMENTARIES, INDICES AND GUIDE, 173, 185-86 (G. Craven ed., 1986); see also G. Lindell, Duty to
Exercise JudicialReview in COMMENTARIES ON THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 150 (Leslie

Zines ed., 1977).
71. See Thomson, supra note 70, at 186-201. The author examines a number of provisions.
First, there is an examination of covering clause 5 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution
Act, this being the British statute which enacted the Australian Constitution. He then analyzes
§§ 71, 73, 74, and 76(i) of the Constitution.
72. See supra section II.B.
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For example, in the Australian Capitol Television decision of 1992 the
Court struck down federal legislation that prohibited radio and television
advertising during election campaigns.73 In lieu thereof, the legislation
established a scheme under which political parties were granted free access to
radio and television. The amount of access depended in part upon the
percentage of votes received by the parties at previous elections. In the view
of the court, this scheme impermissibly encroached on freedom of expression
that is a necessary ingredient of democratic representative government.
Although the Constitution does not expressly guarantee this form of freedom
of expression, the judges were prepared to imply this freedom from the
Constitution when read against the background of Australian democratic
government. 7
C. The Court's Original Jurisdiction
Sections 75 and 76 of the Australian Constitution detail the Court's
original jurisdiction.75 Section 75 sets out five matters where the High Court
possesses original jurisdiction. As they are specified in the Constitution, they
cannot be abrogated by the Parliament. This form of original jurisdiction
often is referred to as inherent jurisdiction. Two of these five matters are of
little significance. They relate to matters "arising under any treaty,"76 or
"affecting consuls" or other foreign representatives.77 The provision on
treaties was borrowed from the United States Constitution.7" In Australia,
however, treaties do not become part of domestic law until the federal or state
parliaments have enacted enabling legislation. Neither treaty nor consular
jurisdiction has been used by the Court.
The final three matters are of more immediate concern. Under section
75(iv) of the Constitution, the High Court possesses diversity jurisdiction. This
constitutional provision enables the Court to hear disputes between two or
more states, between a state and a resident of another state, and between
residents of different states. Because suits between two states often raise
significant legal issues including constitutional questions, this jurisdiction has
been exclusively vested in the High Court.79 However, the High Court has
73. Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 177 C.L.R. 106 (1992); see
also Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills, 177 C.L.R. 1 (1992).
74. AusTL. CONST. §§ 7, 24, 61-64. A recent issue of the University of Sydney Law Review
was devoted to a discussion of this case and of Nationwide News, 177 C.L.R. 1. See
ConstitutionalRights for Australia, 16 SYDNEY L. REV. 245-405 (1994).
75. The law on the original jurisdiction of the High Court is complex and detailed. The best
account is given in ZELMAN COwEN & LESLIE ZINES, FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN AUSTRALIA (2d
ed., 1978). See especially Chapter 1.
76. AUTL. CONST. § 75(i).
77. Id. § 75(ii).
78. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1.
79. Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) § 38(b).
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made it clear that it does not wish to hear claims between residents of different
states that could be initiated in state supreme courts.80 The High Court does
not wish to hear matters relating to traffic accidents simply because the
litigants reside in different states. Section 75(iii) grants the court original
jurisdiction in cases in which the Commonwealth or one of its officers is a
party. Therefore, whenever any federal agency sues or is sued, the matter
may come to the High Court."
The final head of inherent jurisdiction is set out in section 75(v) of the
Constitution. The Court is given a constitutionally enshrined right to review
judicially decisions of officers of the Commonwealth. The framers of the
Constitution were aware of Marbury v. Madison, which prohibited the United
States Supreme Court from issuing prerogative writs against federal officials." Accordingly, the High Court was given the power to issue writs of
prohibition, mandamus, or injunctions against officers of the Commonwealth
of Australia. What is surprising is that the framers of the Constitution failed
to include the writ of certiorari.8 ' To overcome this error of omission, the
court has allowed the writ of prohibition to expand to cover much of the
ground of certiorari. The term "officers of the Commonwealth" has been
given a broad interpretation; even judges of lower federal courts are regarded
as officers of the Commonwealth.'
This power to judicially review the
decisions of federal officials is shared with the Federal Court of Australia,
which has more restricted powers of judicial review.' This limb of inherent
jurisdiction has enabled the Court to ensure that the Commonwealth Government and its officers act in accordance with the law, and over the years the
power of judicial review has generated a significant number of cases dealing
with administrative law86 and constitutional law.
Section 76 of the Australian Constitution enables the Parliament to confer
original jurisdiction on the High Court often described as vested jurisdiction.
The first two paragraphs of this section concern us here.' Under these two
paragraphs, the Parliament is empowered to vest in the High Court jurisdiction
on matters relating to the Constitution8s or concerning the interpretation and

80. See, e.g., Commissioner for Rys. v. Peters, 102 A.L.R. 579 (1991).
81. See Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) §§ 38(c), 40.
82. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1801).

83. See L.J.W. Aitken, The High Court's Power to Grant Certiorari- The Unresolved
Question, 16 FED. L. REV. 370 (1986).
84. See, e.g., The Queen v. Gray, 157 C.L.R. 351 (1985); The Queen v. Judges of the
Commonwealth Indus. Court, 121 C.L.R. 313 (1968).
85. AdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview) Act 1977 (Cth); JudiciaryAct 1903 (Cth) § 39B.

86. See M. ALLARS, INTRODUCTION TO AUSTRALIAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 99-100 (1990).
87. Sections 76(iii) and (iv) of the Australian Constitution give the Parliament power to invest
in the High Court jurisdiction relating to admiralty matters and to issues concerning the same
subject matter claimed under the laws of different states.
88. AUSTL. CONST. § 76(i).
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operation of federal laws. 9 In the past, the Parliament had conferred much
jurisdiction upon the High Court. In 1976 and 1979, however, this jurisdictional load was considerably lightened.' James Crawford has explained the
Court's vested jurisdiction in detail. 9 The major portion of this jurisdiction
involves the Constitution. The High Court has been vested with jurisdiction
to deal with all constitutional matters. 2 Constitutional issues may also be
dealt with in state and federal courts, but litigants have the option of referring
any constitutional issues to the High Court for resolution. 3 This reduction
in the COurt's original jurisdiction has left the Court more time to concentrate
upon constitutional adjudication and the hearing of appeals from state and
federal courts.

D. Appeals to and from the High Court
In 1986, Australia cut its remaining links with the United Kingdom when
the Australian and English Parliaments enacted the Australia Acts.94 Until
the passage of these statutes, the English Privy Council was able to decide
questions of law brought to it by Australian litigants. Ever since 1833, the
Judicial Committee of the English Privy Council (that is judges who in the
main sat in the House of Lords) has been determining appeals from the
colonial courts. Throughout most of this century, the English Privy Council
has handed down decisions on Australian law. To understand the present
position, it is necessary to summarize this chapter of Australia's legal and
constitutional history. It will be then possible to examine the role of the High
Court as our final appellate tribunal.
The story begins with sections 73 and 74 of the Australian Constitution.
Section 73 conferred on the High Court jurisdiction to hear appeals from the
state supreme courts, but this provision did not take away the right of litigants
to appeal from state supreme courts directly to the Privy Council in London.
Section 74 then curtailed, but did not extinguish, appeals from judgments of
the High Court to the Privy Council. The framers of the Australian Constitution did wish to prevent appeals to the Privy Council from the High Court in
relation to all matters touching the Australian Constitution." In order to
obtain legal validity, however, it was necessary for the Constitution to be

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. § 76(ii).
Jurisdiction of Courts (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1979 (Cth).
See CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 181-82.
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) § 30A.
Id. § 40.
Australia Act 1986 (Cth); Australia Act 1986 (UK).
Draft Constitution of Australia 1898, cl. 74.
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enacted by the British Parliament. The British colonial Secretary, Joseph
Chamberlain, wished to retain appeals to the Privy Council on constitutional
questions, primarily to secure British investment interests in Australia. The
compromise, reached in London, was embedded in section 74 of the
Constitution. Appeals from the High Court to the Privy Council were
prohibited in relation to constitutional issues concerning the limits of federal
and state powers, unless the High Court granted a certificate of appeal. 96
Constitutional questions that did not touch federal or state powers could be
appealed to the Privy Council.
Section 74 gave the Australian Parliament a way out by allowing
Parliament to limit appeals from the High Court to the Privy Council. In
1975, Parliament's limitations on this right eliminated such appeals for all
practical purposes.'
Passage of the Australia Acts9" in 1986 finally
extinguished appeals from state courts to the Privy Council. For the last nine
years, the High Court has been our final appellate body. 99
Section 73 of the Australian Constitution confers appellate jurisdiction on
the High Court but gives the Parliament the power to regulate appeals. The
law is technical and complex but, for purposes of this paper, can be stated
briefly.'"u First, appeals from single justices of the High Court to the full
High Court are as of right."10 Second, appeals from the state supreme courts
are by way of leave,"° which means that a litigant must seek leave from the
High Court to appeal to that court. Third, appeals from the territorial courts
also are by leave."0 3 Appeals from the Federal Court of Australia also are
by leave. " However, such appeals may be brought only from full benches
and not from single federal court judges.
The High Court's appellate jurisdiction has enabled it to develop a
common law for Australia. More especially over the last twenty years, the
Court has relied far less upon English common-law precedents. Instead, it has
set itself the task of crafting its own common-law principles.

96. The High Court only granted one such certificate. See Commonwealth of Australia v.
Colonial Sugar Ref. Co. Ltd., 11914] A.C. 237 (P.C. 1913).
97. Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act 1975 (Cth). This statute was held valid
in Commonwealth v. T. & G. Mut. Life Soc'y Ltd., 144 C.L.R. 161 (1978).
98. Australia Act 1986 (Cth) § 9; Australia Act 1986 (UK) § 9.
99. For comments on the Australia Acts, see J. Goldring, The Australia Act 1986 and the
Formal Independence of Australia, 11986] PUB. LAW 192 and H.P. Lee, The Australia Act
1986-Some Legal Conundrums, 14 MONASH U. L. REv. 298 (1988).
100. Given the recent changes in this area, the best and most up-to-date account is CRAWFORD,
supra note 1, at 189-191.
101. Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) § 34.
102. Id. § 35(2).
103. Id. § 35AA; see also Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) § 24(2)(a).
104. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) § 33(2).
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A recent example of this new approach can be seen in the 1992 decision
in the Mabo case. 05 Although this case did not come to the High Court by
way of its appellate jurisdiction, 6 it fits within this discussion of the High
Court and the common law. Ever since its settlement, most orthodox legal
jurists regarded Australia as vacant territory. According to the doctrine of
terra nullius, the entire continent was owned by the English Crown upon
accession to the British Empire. Native Australians were not regarded as
owners of land. In the Mabo case the Court overthrew this old and outmoded
doctrine, holding that where native Australians can show continuous links with
land going back before white settlement, and where the government has not
abrogated those links, then title to that land is vested in those native Australians. "o This decision created some controversy and much has been written
about native land rights."I Mabo shows that the Court is able to mould
common-law doctrines to suit an Australian nation that is sailing toward the
21st century.
V. LABOR COURTS AND LABOR DISPUTES

A. The Commonwealth Court of Conciliation andArbitration
A year after the Australian Parliament established the High Court, it
created the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration. t 9 The
purpose of this court was to settle interstate labor disputes through conciliation
and, where this failed, through final and binding compulsory interest
arbitration. Often outsiders are surprised to learn that the second-oldest
Australian federal court was solely engaged in resolving disputes between
labor and capital. The reason for this is that since the turn of the century,
Australians have perceived that legal intervention in labor disputes has been
able to secure, for the vast bulk of the work force, fair and reasonable terms
and conditions of employment. It is only since the mid-1980s when large
areas of the Australian economy were deregulated that the benefits of this form
of legal intervention have been questioned. 10
The move to establish the first labor court can be traced back to the early
1890s when protracted labor disputes occurred in Australia's shipping and
sheep grazing industries."' As these disputes crisscrossed the borders of the
105. Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2), 175 C.L.R. 1 (1992).
106. The matter actually commenced in the original jurisdiction of the Court.
107. Mabo, 175 C.L.R. 1.
108. See generally 15 SYDNEY L. REV. 121-267 (1993) (symposium on Mabo case). See also
F. BRENNAN, SHARING THE COUNTRY: THE CASE FOR AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN BLACK AND

WHITE AUSTRALIANS (2d ed., 1994).
109. Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth).
110. For a useful commentary, see Richard Mitchell & Malcolm Rimmer, Labour Law,
Deregulation,and Flexibility in AustralianIndustrialRelations, 12 COMP. LAB. L.J. 1 (1990).
111. The best account of this period is given by the authors of a collection of essays in
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Australian colonies, no single colonial government was able to settle them.
By 1894, the trade unions had been defeated and the workers resumed
employment on terms specified by the employers. A group of liberal
reformers asserted that industrial peace could be established if labor courts
were given powers to settle labor disputes by conciliation, and where this
failed, by final and binding interest arbitration. By 1916, four states (New
South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, and Western Australia) had created
labor courts with powers of compulsory arbitration,"' with the two remaining states establishing wages board mechanisms." 3
During the 1890s, the benefits of labor arbitration were being discussed
at the same time the founders of the nation were drafting the Australian
Constitution. Not surprisingly, therefore, those attending the 1898 Convention
decided to give the Australian government power to establish a national labor
court that could settle labor disputes that crossed state boundaries. Section
51(xxxv) of the Australian Constitution empowers Parliament to establish
machinery
necessary to conciliate and arbitrate upon interstate labor dis1 14
putes.
During 1903 and 1904, protracted debates occurred in the Commonwealth
Parliament over the powers of a federal labor court. As a result, the
Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration was created in 1904.1 5
The Australian Constitution did not require that the processes of conciliation
and arbitration be exercised by a court. It was believed, however, that only
a court staffed by a senior judge would have the necessary status and authority
to carry out such tasks, particularly in the face of concerted employer
opposition." 6 Accordingly, a high-ranking judge was appointed as president
of the court. The president was to be drawn from the ranks of the High Court
justices and was to be appointed to the Labor Court for a renewable term of
FOUNDATIONS OF

ARBITRATION:

THE ORIGINS

AND

EFFECTS OF STATE

COMPULSORY

ARBITRATION 1890-1914 (Stuart Macintyre & Richard Mitchell eds., 1989).

For a shorter
account by an American scholar, see L.S. Merrifield, The Origin of Australian Labor
Conciliationand Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL COLLECTION OF ESSAYS: IN MEMORIUM, SIR
OTTO KAHN-FREUND 173 (F. Gamillscheg ed., 1980). Those wishing to examine a contemporary
account should peruse the readable yet partisan chronicle by the union leader W.G. Spence, W.G.
SPENCE, AUSTRALIA'S AWAKENING: THIRTY YEARS IN THE LIFE OF AN AUSTRALIAN AGITATOR

(1909).
112. See J.H. PORTUS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUSTRALIAN TRADE UNION LAW 100-115

(1958).
113. The states of Victoria and Tasmania set up tripartite bodies called wages boards having
the power to specify terms and conditions of labor throughout the industries within their
jurisdiction.
114. Section 51(xxxv) provides that the Parliament may legislate with respect to "Conciliation
and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits
of any one state." AUSTL. CONST. § 51 (xxxv).
115. Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth).
116. See D. Plowman & G.F. Smith, Moulding FederalArbitration:The Employers and the
High Court 1903-35, 11 AUSTL. J. MGMT. 203 (1986).
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seven years. "7 In other words, the president would continue as a justice of
the High Court with life tenure but would simultaneously hold a fixed term
appointment as president of the labor court.
The court was given wide-ranging powers. It could prevent and settle
interstate labor disputes either by determining that an agreement that had been
reached after conciliation should be certified as enforceable in the public
interest or by arbitrating a settlement of terms and conditions of employment
and embodying them in an enforceable award of the court. Powers also were
given to the court to enforce its decisions and to fine recalcitrant trade unions
and employers.
From 1907 to 1921, Henry Bournes Higgins served as the second
President of the labor court." 8 During his tenure, he did more than any
other person has to establish compulsory arbitration as the accepted method of
determining fair and just terms and conditions of employment. In 1907, for
example, he established a basic or minimum wage that was sufficient for
working men to sustain a wife and children in frugal comfort." 9 During this
time, the pronouncements of the federal Labor Court became national bench
marks and were adopted by the state courts and tribunals. Henry Bournes
Higgins regarded compulsory arbitration as a social and economic success.
At the end of his fourteen year reign as President of the Labor Court, he
compiled his writings into a little book which he styled his "New Province for
Law and Order."'"2 By the close of the First World War, compulsory labor
arbitration had become a fact of Australian life.
B. The Boilermakers' Doctrine and the Separationof JudicialPower
In 1918 a challenge was made to the powers of the court. This legal
attack eventually was to have long-term consequences, not solely for the Labor
Court, but for the entire federal judiciary. The Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia, a union of longshoremen registered with the Labor Court,
was fined for striking in contravention of court orders. In Alexander's
case" the High Court held that the president of the Labor Court could not
exercise federal judicial power, and hence the fine imposed on the trade union
was void." The High Court also found that the appointment of the president was contrary to section 72 of the Australian Constitution. It will be
recalled that until a 1977 amendment, section 72 provided that federal judges
were to have life tenure. The president was only appointed to the Labor Court
for a seven-year term. Even though the president retained his life tenure as

117. Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) § 12(1).
118. The first President was Justice O'Connor.
124. See, e.g., K.J. Hancock, The FirstHalf Century of Australian Wage Policy, J.INDUS.
REL. 1, 129 (1979).
125. R.J. Hawke, The Commonwealth Arbitration Court: Legal Tribunal or Economic
Legislature, 3 U. W.A. L. Rav. 422 (1956).
126. I am grateful to the late Sir Richard Eggleston, counsel for the trade union in this case.
In several warm and delightful conversations, he explained the background to the Boilermakers'
decisions.
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a judge of the High Court, the appointment as the president was not for life.
In 1926, the Parliament amended the act by making life-time appointments to
the Labor Court."
It is not the purpose of this paper to trace the jurisprudence of the federal
Labor Court in its first half century of dispute settling,'24 other than to make
the point that its decisions on general wage increases had a significant impact
on Australian life. In the view of former Prime Minister Bob Hawke (who
undertook graduate work in this area), by the mid-1950s the court had begun
to take on the trappings of an economic legislature.'25 The growth in postWorld War II Australia led to a virtually full-employment economy. Added
to this prosperity was the rather high inflation of the early 1950s. Given these
circumstances, the increased role of the court in dividing these economic gains
was hardly surprising.
In this climate, it was perhaps inevitable that a High Court challenge
would be mounted against the powers of the Labor Court. In 1956, the
Boilermakers' case came before the courts. 12 6 The Boilermakers' Society of
Australia, a registered trade union, challenged the legality of a fine by the
court. The argument was that the Australian Constitution required a
separation of judicial and general legislative powers and, therefore, the Labor
Court was unconstitutional because it impermissibly commingled judicial
functions with administrative powers. The court's activities in certifying
agreements and arbitrating awards were administrative acts, whereas the
enforcement of its orders amounted to the exercise of judicial power. In the
Boilermakers' case, the High Court 27 and the Privy Council' 2 accepted
this argument. It was held that federal courts could only exercise federal
judicial powers and that it was impermissible to bestow nonjudicial functions
on these bodies. Even at the time of these judgments, many prominent
lawyers criticized the rigid separation of administrative and judicial powers
that would henceforth be imposed on federal courts. 2 9
The Boilermakers' doctrine, as it has become known, has ensured the
continued growth of case law that characterizes and delimits the boundaries of
federal judicial power. 3 ' Although the rigidities of this doctrine have been
123. Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act (Amendment) Act 1926 (Cth).
124. See, e.g., K.J. Hancock, The FirstHalf Century of Australian Wage Policy, J. INDUS.
REL. 1, 129 (1979).
125. R.J. Hawke, The Commonwealth Arbitration Court: Legal Tribunal or Economic
Legislature, 3 U. W.A. L. REV. 422 (1956).
126. I am grateful to the late Sir Richard Eggleston, counsel for the trade union in this case.
In several warm and delightful conversations, he explained the background to the Boilermakers'
decisions.
127. The Queen v. Kirby, 94 C.L.R. 254 (1956).
128. Attorney-General for Australia v. The Queen, [1957] A.C. 288.
129. See, e.g., G. Sawer, Separationof Powers in the AustralianFederation,35 AUSTL. L.J.
177 (1961).
130. For discussion of this case law, see LESLIE ZINES, THE HIGH COURT AND THE
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lessened in recent years,' at the federal level it still is impermissible to
establish one agency to conciliate and arbitrate and also to make orders
enforcing its decisions.
C. Labor Courts 1956-1994
Even before this decision was affirmed by the Privy Council' 32 the
Australian government decided to divide the functions of the Labor Court'
between a Conciliation and Arbitration Commission and an Industrial
Court. 3 4 As is now well known, the new commission was given the
administrative tasks of settling labor disputes by promulgating awards or by
certifying agreements. On the other hand, the new Industrial Court was left
with a narrow range of functions including the enforcement of awards and
agreements and the general supervision of internal trade union affairs." 5
The Industrial Court began in 1956 with a bench of three judges. 3 6 By
the time of the establishment of the Federal Court in early 1977 the Industrial
Court had a Chief Judge and eleven other justices and a growing non-labor
jurisdiction. 3 7 Although not prescribed in the enabling legislation, the
judges of the Industrial Court were appointed in part because of their
knowledge of labor law and industrial relations. Their minds, therefore, were,
on the whole, less divorced from industrial relations matters than those of
judges who had been appointed to less specialized courts. Furthermore, on
many industrial matters that came before them, they were required to sit in full
benches comprising two, then later three, judges. 3 In our view, this gave
the Industrial Court a much greater degree of collegiality than is the case with
courts hearing matters at first instance by a single judge. Although this court

CONSTITUTION, 151-84 (3d ed., 1992).

131. See, e.g., The Queen v. Quinn, 138 C.L.R. 1 (1977); see also ZINES, supra note 130,
at 149-50; HAROLD E. RENFREE, THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF AUSTRALIA 90-93 (1984).

132. Attorney-General for Australia v. The Queen, [1957) A.C. 288.
133. For background to the division of functions and the politics which went with this split,
see B. D'ALPUGET, MEDIATOR: A BIOGRAPHY OF SIR RICHARD KIRBY 149-57 (1977).

134. Conciliation and Arbitration (Amendment) Act 1956 (Cth); see also Conciliation and
Arbitration (Amendment) Act (No. 2) 1956 (Cth).
135. In 1956, the Commission's title was the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration
Commission while that of the court was the Commonwealth Industrial Court, In 1973, the word
"Commonwealth" was replaced by the word "Australian" in both these titles.
136. Section 98 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) as it stood in 1956 provided
that the Commonwealth Industrial Court should consist of a Chief Judge and two other judges.
This provision was amended from time to time, increasing the number of judges to 11 by 1976.
137. Its most interesting area of non-industrial jurisdiction was that given to it by the Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
138. Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) § 104. For details of the intricate
amendments to this section, see C.P. MILLS & G. SORRELL, FEDERAL INDUSTRIAL LAws 286
(5th ed., 1975).
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decided many cases on the scope of awards and on internal trade union affairs
few landmark decisions139 remain of relevance to present labor law. 4 As
will be detailed below, 14 1 in 1976 the Australian Parliament enacted legislation to establish the Federal Court of Australia.1 42 The legislators also
decided to transfer the labor relations jurisdiction from the Industrial Court to
the Federal Court of Australia. To this end, an industrial division of the
federal court was established and was bestowed the labor relations jurisdiction. 43 It was believed that a separate division of the court could continue
the work of the Industrial Court and maintain the specialized nature of this
jurisdiction. 1" In practice, however, most of the federal court judges were
appointed to the general and industrial divisions. By the mid-1980s, for all
practical purposes, the federal court was operating as though the industrial
division had been abolished. Although space does not permit an analysis of
the labor relations decisions that were handed down by the Federal Court from
1977 to 1994,145 many of its decisions were innovative. For example, the
court adopted an interventionist approach to trade union rules, vigorously
asserting that trade unions should operate in accordance with democratic
values 46 and that their officials should be properly
accountable to the
47
members in relation to the expenditure of funds. 1
D. The Search for an Industrial Court
In 1983 the Australian government commissioned an inquiry into federal
industrial relations law. In 1985, the committee argued for the creation of an
Australian Labor Court. 4 The committee sought to create a court and a
commission that could operate as though it were a single agency, undoing the
damage caused by the Boilermakers' doctrine. Under this plan, an Australian

139. But see Moore v. Doyle, 15 F.L.R. 59 (1969) (a major exception relating to the legal
personality of trade unions that are simultaneously registered under federal and state industrial
laws).
140. For strong criticism of the Industrial Court, see F. Hutley, What's Wrong with the Family
Law Act, QUADRANT Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 73.
141. See infra section 6.
142. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).
143. Id. § 13.
144. See the second reading speech to the Federal Court of Australia Bill 1976 by the
Attorney-General R.J. Ellicott, Hansard, October 21, 1976, H.R., vol. 101 2110, 2112.
145. For an analysis, see R.C. McCallum, A Modern Renaissance: Industrial Law and
Relations Under Federal Wigs 1977-1992, 14 SYDNEY L. REv. 401 (1992).
146. See, e.g., Wright v. McLeod, 74 F.L.R. 146 (1983).
147. See, e.g., Scott v. Jess 3 F.C.R. 263 (1984).
148. REP. OF THE COMM. OF INQUIRY INTO AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LAW AND
SYSTEMS (the Hancock Committee) (Australian Government Publishing Service, 1985). For the
relevant recommendations, see vol. 1, 10-12 recommendations23-35; for the arguments, see vol.
2, 380-98.
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Industrial Relations Commission would be established together with an
Australian Labor Court. The judges of the court would be concurrently
appointed to the new Commission. It appears that it was hoped that these joint
appointees would be able to use judicial or administrative powers, depending
on whether they were sitting in the court or the Commission.
One area where the Boilermakers' doctrine caused special difficulties
related to unfair dismissals. At that time, although members of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission could hold that dismissals were unfair, they
could not order the employer to reinstate or to compensate the employees,
even if reinstatement was an appropriate method of settling an industrial
dispute, because such orders amounted to the exercise of judicial power. In a
series of subsequent cases, the High Court endeavored to sort out this
mess,' 49 but it was not until two decisions were handed down in mid-1993
that it was possible for Commission members to order compensation or
reinstatement to resolve industrial disputes. 15
In 1987, the Australian government endeavored to carry through this
reform by creating an Australian Labor Court. Under the Industrial Relations
Bill 1987, an Australian Labor Court was to be established' and was to be
given jurisdiction over federal industrial relations,' 52 including cases relating
to trade union secondary boycott activities.' 53 The judges of this court were
required to possess the normal qualifications for judicial office. However, the
bill went further by providing that they also were required to possess "skills
and experience in the field of industrial relations" that in the opinion of the
Governor-General made them suitable persons to be appointed as judges." 4
These proposed qualifications also represented a departure from established
policy. Appointees to neither the old labor court nor the Industrial Court were
required to meet qualifications other than being suitable judges. The selection
of such appointments from the pool of qualified persons was left to the good
sense of the government of the day. Judges of the Australian Labor Court also
were able to hold joint appointments as presidential members of the Industrial
Relations Commission' and could be appointed concurrently as Federal
Court judges.' 56 After employer opposition to other aspects of this bill, it
was withdrawn by the government. When the Industrial Relations Act
1988 ' was enacted by Parliament the following year, it did not establish a

149. See, e.g., Re Ranger Uranium Mines Pty. Ltd., 163 C.L.R. 656 (1987).
150. Re Boyne Smelters Ltd., 112 A.L.R. 359 (1993); Re Printing and Kindred Indus. Union,
113 A.L.R. 421 (1993).
151. Industrial Relations Bill 1987 (Cth) cl.
47.
152. Id. at cl.
62-75.
153. Id. at cl.
90.
154. Id. at cI. 49(b).
155. Id. at ci. 51.
156. Industrial Relations Bill 1987 (Cth) cl.
52.
157. Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth). This statute repealed the existing industrial relations
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new court. Labor relations jurisdiction remained with the Federal Court of
Australia.
E. The IndustrialRelations Court of Australia
In late 1993 the Australian Parliament enacted the Industrial Relations
Reform Act,' 58 which ushered in the most far-reaching changes to Australian
labor law since the establishment of compulsory arbitration at the turn of the
century. 5 9 Broadly speaking, this statute transformed federal labor law from
a mechanism based upon the concepts of conciliation and arbitration to one in
which enterprise bargaining is to become the primary means of settling terms
and conditions of employment. The Industrial Relations Commission will
underpin this bargaining with the promulgation of awards, which will
safeguard minimum employment conditions.
As part of this package of reforms, the Parliament created the Industrial
Relations Court of Australia." 6 The labor relations jurisdiction that had
been vested in the Federal Court has been transferred to the Industrial
Relations Court' which now possesses original jurisdiction in federal labor
relations matters. 62 The Industrial Relations Court also has appellate
jurisdiction. First, with some significant exceptions, 63 its full benches may
hear appeals from single judges,"6 and second, it may hear appeals from
state and territorial courts on labor relations matters."c The court also is
empowered to answer questions asked of it by the Industrial Relations
Commission."
Appeals from decisions of the Full Industrial Relations
Court to the High Court, with some exceptions,' 67 require leave to appeal
from the High Court. 161

legislation, and this statute is now the central piece of federal labor legislation.
158. Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth). This statute made extensive amendments to
the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth). Accordingly, references are, in the main, to the
Industrial Relations Act.
159. See Ronald C. McCallum, The Internationalizationof Australian IndustrialLaw: The
IndustrialRelations Reform Act 1993, 16 SYDNEY L. REv. 122 (1994). For more details, see
7 AUSTL. J. LAB. L. 105-226 (1994).
160. For commentaries on this new court, see J.T. Ludeke, The StructuralFeaturesof the New
System, 7 AuSTL. J. LAB. L. 132, 141-46 (1994); J.W. Shaw, The IndustrialRelations Courtof
Australia, in EMPLOYMENT SECURITY (Ronald C. McCallum et al. eds., 1994).
161. Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth) § 59.
162. Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) § 412.
163. Id. § 421.
164. Id. § 420.
165. Id. § 422.
166. Id. §§ 46, 415(2).
167. Some matters, especially those dealing with inquiries into trade union ballots, are not
appealable to the High Court. See Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) § 432(3).
168. Id. § 432.
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The Industrial Relations Court is constituted by a Chief Justice and nine
other judges. The Governor-General, on advice from the federal cabinet,
appoints the judges of the court in the same manner as other federal judges. 69 The government did not resurrect its 1987 policy of requiring
specialist judges to have experience in labor relations law. All of the present
judges, save one, 170 have been appointed from the ranks of the judges of the
Federal Court of Australia, and these judges still hold their commissions as
judges of the Federal Court.' 7
The jurisdiction of the Industrial Relations Court is far broader than that
possessed by the former Industrial Court because the last fifteen years have
witnessed significant labor relations changes, especially at the federal level.
Over the next half dozen years, the judges of this new court will face many
challenges in the process of moulding labor relations law. One field that will
take much of their time relates to the unfair dismissal of employees. As part
of the 1993 reform package, the Parliament established an unfair dismissals
regime that is available to a majority of the Australian workforce. 72 The
Industrial Relations Court has been given jurisdiction to reinstate and
compensate unfairly dismissed workers. 71 In order to prevent the court
from being overwhelmed by claims, the statute empowers the government to
appoint judicial registrars to hear most unfair termination matters. 74 In a
recent judgment, the High Court held that the appointment of judicial
registrars to resolve matrimonial issues did not violate the concept of federal
judicial power.' 7 Provided that the judicial registrars observe guidelines
and that their decisions are automatically open to complete rehearings by a
court, these registrars will only be exercising delegated powers. The precious
concept of judicial power will continue to reside in the courts. At the time of
writing, four judicial registrars have been appointed to hear unfair dismissal
claims. While judicial power remains with the courts, the use of these
registrars is a sensible approach, especially for small claims.
When we examined the original jurisdiction of the High Court, 76 we
saw that it could judicially review decisions of Commonwealth officers.' 77
We also observed that federal judges could be judicially reviewed via this
mechanism. Many of the High Court's judicial review decisions have related

169. Id. § 362.
170. Judge Michael Moore was formerly a presidential member of the Australian Industrial
Relations Commission.
171. Judges of the Industrial Relations Court may hold concurrent appointments on the Federal
Court of Australia. Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) §§ 162(6) and (8).
172. See id. §§ 170CA-170EE.
173. Id. § 170EE.
174. Id. §§ 375-381.
175. See Harris v. Caladine, 172 C.L.R. 84 (1991).
176. See supra section IV.D.
177. AuSTL. CONST. § 75(v).
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to the powers and functions of the members of the Industrial Relations
Commission. Until the establishment of the Industrial Relations Court, only
the High Court could judicially review decisions of the Commission. For
several years, the present Chief Justice has argued that such matters should not
waste the time of the highest court in the land.'
Accordingly, under a
complicated process, the Industrial Relations Court has been empowered to
review decisions of Commission members. When an applicant seeks judicial
review before the High Court, that court may remit the matter to the Industrial
Relations Court, which may then engage in the process of judicial review.179
Finally, it should be mentioned that the Industrial Relations Court is given
special powers to hear claims brought by seven or more persons who have an
interest in the outcome of the matter. 80 This representative process may be
useful for various groups of litigants. For example, a dozen employees who
believe that their employer has failed to pay them their wages could take
advantage of this process. The broad jurisdiction that has been reposed in the
court will give its judges special responsibilities. They will be required not
only to administer the law but also to consider the intricacies of Australian
industrial relations practice, a job which straddles the political and economic
processes in our nation.
VI. THE FEDERAL COURT AUSTRALIA
A. The Vesting of FederalJurisdictionin State Courts
Apart from the High Court and the labor courts, the Australian Parliament
only created one other federal court before 1975. This was the Federal Court
of Bankruptcy, established in 1930. This court only operated in the states of
New South Wales and Victoria, and its work has been subsumed by the
Federal Court of Australia. Unlike the United States Congress, the Australian
Parliament did not establish a separate system of federal courts to administer
federal law. Instead, the government was able to utilize what has been
described as the "autochthonous expedient";18 the government was able to
use the indigenous solution of vesting state courts with federal jurisdiction.
This vesting is exceedingly complex, and it has taxed the minds of academics
and judges alike. 8 2 Since the creation of the Federal Court of Australia in
1976, however, these vesting rules are of less consequence. Nevertheless, a
brief description is warranted here.

178. Sir Anthony Mason, The State of the AustralianJudicature, 61 AUSTL. L. J. 681, 682
(1987).
179. See Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) § 44; Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) § 412.
180. Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) §§ 433-459.
181. The Queen v. Kirby, 94 C.L.R. 254, 268 (1956) (Dixon, C.J.).
182. For a detailed account, see COWEN & ZINES, supra note 75, at 174-233 and for a briefer
and more up to date description, see CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 38-43.
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Under section 77(iii) of the Australian Constitution, the federal Parliament
is empowered to vest in the courts of the states all the original jurisdiction
bestowed upon the High Court of Australia by sections 75 and 76 of the
Constitution. When giving this jurisdiction to the state courts, the Parliament
may impose conditions upon its exercise. For example, the Parliament has
provided that where state courts exercise federal jurisdiction, no appeal lay to
the Privy Council. The High Court could grant leave to hear appeals despite
state law to the contrary. In respect to courts of summary jurisdiction,
magistrates were required to be designated to hear such cases by the GovernorGeneral." 3 It will be recalled"s that section 75 of the Australian Constitution gives the High Court inherent jurisdiction, specifying the heads of
jurisdiction reposed in the High Court. On the other hand, section 76 of the
Constitution enables the Parliament to vest areas of original jurisdiction in the
High Court. Under section 76(ii), for example, the federal Parliament has
vested in the High Court jurisdiction relating to the operation and interpretation of federal laws, such as those relating to intellectual property.
While section 77(iii) of the Constitution enables the Parliament to bestow
this original jurisdiction on the state courts, the jurisdiction of those courts
already encompassed some of the original jurisdiction. For example, under
its diversity jurisdiction,' 85 the High Court may hear actions between
residents of different states. However, the state supreme courts have always
possessed the power to determine claims between residents in different states,
provided all of the procedural requirements are satisfied. Section 77(ii) of the
Constitution, however, gives the Australian Parliament the power to declare
that federal jurisdiction that is reposed in federal courts shall be exclusive to
those federal courts. In other words, the federal Parliament has the power to
deprive the state courts of any of this original jurisdiction that they possessed
in 1901 when the Constitution came into force.
When the Australian Parliament bestowed original jurisdiction on state
supreme courts in 1903, it adopted a two-stage approach. In the first stage,
the Parliament made all of the original jurisdiction in section 75 exclusive to
the High Court. Parliament further provided that all of the section 76
jurisdiction that was reposed in the High Court was exclusive to that
Court. ' 6 This meant that the state courts retained none of the original
jurisdiction in section 75, nor did they retain any of the jurisdiction which had
been reposed in the High Court under section 76. In the second stage, the
Parliament gave much of the original jurisdiction in sections 75 and 76 to the
state courts. I" Some of the section 76 jurisdiction that had been reposed in

183. Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) §§ 39(2)(a), (c) and (d).
184. See supra section IV.C.
185. AuSTL. CONST. § 75(iv).
186. Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) § 39(1).
187. Id. § 39(2). See also § 38, which details which areas of original jurisdiction are
exclusively vested in the High Court.
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the state courts had never been given to the High Court. This left the courts
with a nice jurisdictional conundrum: When a state court was exercising some
of this non-exclusive jurisdiction, was it utilizing federal jurisdiction that was
subject to conditions, or could its judges assert that they were exercising state
jurisdiction free from these federal fetters? In the end, the High Court held
that the federal jurisdiction was inconsistent with, and accordingly prevailed
over, the residual state jurisdiction.' 8
On the whole, the vesting of federal jurisdiction in state courts has
worked well. It is still the case that much federal jurisdiction is exercised by
state judges and magistrates. One such area relates to the illegal importation
of drugs. Although this is a federal offence,' 9 committals and criminal
trials are heard by the state courts. This harmonious approach to federal
jurisdiction has enabled federal and state judges to work together, and has
made our court structure more unified than it might otherwise have been. To
fill in the gap in this picture, it is necessary to turn our attention to the Federal
Court of Australia.
B. The Evolution of the Federal Court
On February 7, 1977, the Federal Court of Australia opened its doors for
business. 'I Its origins can be traced to the Thirteenth Legal Convention of
the Law Council of Australia, which was held in Hobart in February
1963.' 9' Byers Q.C. and Toose Q.C. delivered a paper proposing an
Australian federal court."'9 Solicitor-General Sir Kenneth Bailey responded
with an announcement that the federal Cabinet had given approval to the
Attorney-General, Sir Garfield Barwick, to proceed with plans for just such
a court.
In their paper, Byers and Toose argued that federal administration would
be better served by removing the federal jurisdiction reposed in State supreme
courts and giving it to a federal court. 93 They argued that such a move also
would relieve the High Court of much of its routine original jurisdiction and
that federal matters should be decided by federal courts, leaving state matters
This proposal received some strong
in the hands of state courts." 9

188. Felton v. Mulligan, 124 C.L.R. 367 (1971).
189. Customs Act 1901 (Cth) § 233B.
190. The Federal Court of Australia was established by the Federal Court of Australia Act

1976 (Cth).
191. For a brief account of the origins of the Federal Court, see CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at
150-51 and The Federal Court of Australia Comes Into Being, 51 AUSTL. L.J. 55 (1977).
192. M.H. Byers & P.B. Toose, The Necessity for a New Federal Court (A Survey of the
Federal Court System in Australia), 36 AUSTL. L.J. 308 (1963).

193. Id.
194. Id.
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opposition, 95 for the removal of federal jurisdiction from state supreme
courts was perceived by some as lowering the status of those courts.
When Sir Garfield Barwick announced his preferred option in June 1964,
he shied away from the complete separation of the state and federal jurisdictions.'1 6 His proposal was that the state courts should retain their existing
federal jurisdiction. The proposed superior court was to become a repository
for specialized federal jurisdiction, such as matters relating to taxation and
intellectual property. The proposed court also was to be given some aspects
of the High Court's original jurisdiction, and it was to have some appellate
work. After a gap of three years, Attorney-General Bowen outlined the
approach of the government to the establishment of a superior court in May
1967.117 A year and a half later, a bill was introduced into Parliament to
establish a superior court.' 9 This bill'9 9 adopted the essence of the Barwick proposals of 1964.1 While the bill sought to relieve the High Court
of original jurisdiction, it did not divest the state supreme courts of any of
their federal jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the bill lapsed, and the measure was
not revived by the government.
When the Australian Labor Party came to power in 1972 under Prime
Minister Gough Whitlam, it resuscitated the plans for a superior court. This
administration favored the Byers and Toose proposals of 1963. Whitlam and
his cabinet regarded the High Court as the guarantor of the Constitution and
the final court of appeal for Australia on substantial questions of law. The
government wished to rid the High Court of the more mundane aspects of its
original and appellate jurisdiction making a new federal court the primary
repository for federal jurisdiction. In part, it was believed that divesting state
supreme courts of federal jurisdiction, would enable the government to carry
out procedural reforms to speed up and simplify federal litigation.2"' In
December 1973, the attorney-general introduced a bill for the establishment
of a superior court into the Senate (the upper house of the Australian Parliament).2" This bill, together with two subsequent bills,2 3 was defeated.
195. See id. at 321-29.
196. Garfield Barwick, The AustralianJudicialSystem: The ProposedNew FederalSuperior
Court, 1 FED. L. REV. 1 (1964). The editors of the Federal Law Review stated that this paper
had been written by Sir Garfield before April 23, 1964. On this date, it was announced that Sir
Garfield was to be appointed as Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia. In the paper, Sir
Garfield made it clear that he was writing in his capacity as a member of the government and not
in any judicial capacity.
197. C. OF AuSTL., P. DEBATES, H. OF R., N.H. Bowen, May 18, 1967, 2235; see also N.H.
Bowen, Some Aspects of the Superior Court Proposal,41 AUSTL. L.J. 336 (1967) (speech to the
Fourteenth Legal Convention of the Law Council of Australia held in Adelaide in July 1967).
198. C. OF AUSTL., P. DEBATES, H. OF R., N.H. Bowen, November 21, 1968 3142.
199. Commonwealth Superior Court Bill 1968 (Cth).
200. See P.H. Lane, The Commonwealth Superior Court, 43 AUSTL. L. J. 148 (1969).
201. See A.R. Blackshield, Judges and the CourtSystem, in LABOR AND THE CONSTITUTION
1972-1975 105, 109-11 (Gareth Evans ed., 1977).
202. See Superior Court of Australia Bill 1973 (Cth); C. OF AUSTL., P. DEBATES, S., Senator
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The conservative political patties opposed the measures, and it appears that
concerns were again expressed that the state supreme courts would decline in
importance if they no longer possessed significant amounts of federal
jurisdiction. 2'
By 1975 it was clear that something had to be done about the administration of federal laws. As the Australian government utilized more and more of
its constitutional powers, pressures were placed on the courts. For example,
the Australian Parliament had enacted mild antitrust legislation in 1965, 205
but in 1974, a much stronger statute was passed." 6 This Act dealt not only
with antitrust matters but also with consumer protection.'
Yet, at the time
these measures were enacted, the Industrial Court was the only federal court
in which this new jurisdiction could be reposed. In August 1975, in a rather
uncharacteristic outburst from the bench, Judge Gibbs and several of his
brother High Court judges spoke against the failure to reform the High Court's
appellate jurisdiction.
Ironically, a conservative government" 9 oversaw the passage of the
legislation establishing the Federal Court of Australia.21 When the attorneygeneral introduced the Federal Court of Australia Bill'" in October
1976,212 it was clear that the government had opted largely for the Barwick
model of 1964. The bill gave the Federal Court of Australia special federal
jurisdiction, as well as some appellate work in federal matters and transferred
the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court and the Federal Court of Bankruptcy to
the Federal Court.213 The new court was to be given powers to hear appeals
from the Territory Courts, thus relieving the High Court of this appellate

L.K. Murphy Q.C., Dec. 12, 1973, 2724.
203. Superior Court of Australia Bill (No 1) 1974 (Cth); Superior Court of Australia Bill (No.
2) 1974 (Cth).
204. In a speech which was delivered at the Eighteenth Legal Convention of the Law Council
of Australia which was held in Canberra in July 1975, Prime E.G. Minister Whitlam
congratulated those supreme court judges who had opposed the superior court bills on their
"unparalleled skill as lobbyists." 49 AUSTL. L.J. 310, 310 (1975).
205. Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1965 (Cth).
206. Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
207. Id. part VI.
208. Moller v. Roy, 132 C.L.R. 622, 632-33 (per Gibbs, J.)(1975); see also id. at 638-39
(per Stephen, J.); id. at 639 (per Mason, J.); id. at 640 (per Jacobs, J.).
209. The Liberal National Party Coalition Government came to power in November 1975.
210. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).
211. Federal Court of Australia Bill 1976 (Cth).
212. C. oF AuSTL., P. DEBATES, H. OF R., R.J. Ellicott Q.C., October 21, 1976, 2110. See
also the second reading speech of this bill in the Senate, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates,
Senate, Senator Durack, November 16, 1976, 1952.
213. Separate amending statutes transferred this jurisdiction to the Federal Court. See
Conciliation and Arbitration Amendment Act (No. 3) 1976 (Cth); and Bankruptcy Amendment
Act 1976 (Cth).
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jurisdiction. In effect, this approach amounted to little more than a rationalization of existing federal resources.2 14
C. The Federal Court of Australia
The Federal Court of Australia began operations in February 1977.
Under the Federal Court of Australia Act, judges of the court are appointed
in the usual manner by the Governor-General.2 15 It is possible for judges to
hold concurrent appointments in other federal or territory courts. 216 A full
court of the Federal Court must be constituted by at least three judges.217
The Federal Court of Australia Act did not bestow any original jurisdiction on the court. 28 Rather, it was decided that Parliament should, from
time to time, invest the court with original or concurrent jurisdiction as it saw
fit. When seeking to ascertain the court's original jurisdiction, it is therefore
necessary to search through the statute books to see what matters have been
given to the court. Until 1994, the court exercised labor relations jurisdiction,
but as we have seen, 21 9 this area of law has been given to the Industrial
Relations Court.
In February 1977, a Chief Justice and eighteen other judges were
appointed to the court. All of these judges, except for Chief Justice Bowen
and Judge Keely, were appointed from the ranks of the federal judiciary.
During this brief span of years, the Federal Court has grown in size and is
presently made up of a Chief Justice and forty-one judges spread across the
continent. The Federal Court has become the most significant court in our
nation, except for the High Court of Australia. Its judgments impact upon
many aspects of the daily lives of Australians. Significantly, three of the
seven High Court justices served periods of apprenticeship in the Federal
Court.
The court's major fields of original jurisdiction z20 include bankruptcy,t 1 antitrust and consumer protection,' m intellectual property, m the
making of enforceable orders under antidiscrimination legislation,' 4 taxa214. For comment and analysis, see P.H. Lane, The New FederalJurisdiction,54 AUSTL. L.J.
11(1980).
215. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) § 6.

216. Id. § 6(5).
217. Id. § 14(2).
218. Id. § 19.
219. See supra section V.E.
220. See generally CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 151-55.
221. Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
222. Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
223. The Jurisdiction of Courts (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1987 (Cth) bestowed original
jurisdiction on the Federal Court undervarious intellectualproperty statutes including the Patents
Act 1952 (Cth) and the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth).
224. Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) §§ 25Z-25ZI; Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth)
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tion,' admiralty, 226 corporations law, 7 the judicial review of government administrative decisions," and the supervision of various federal
tribunals. 9
The Federal Court possesses significant appellate jurisdiction." °
Litigants may appeal to the Full Federal Court from decisions of single judges.
Appeals from territorial supreme courts (other than the Supreme Court of the
Northern Territory which has its own Full Court) are to the Federal
Court." Before the establishment of the Federal Court, such appeals went
directly to the High Court, and this is one area where that court's appellate
jurisdiction has been lessened.
In our view, the major reason that the Federal Court has become such a
significant part of the Australian legal framework is the Australian Parliament's increased use of its federal powers. As we showed in section 3 above,
in recent years the Parliament has utilized various heads of constitutional
power to increase the scope of federal law. In the field of consumer
protection, for example,2 2 many cases relating to misleading and deceptive
statements and conduct by sellers have been brought in the Federal Court.
Another major area of legal growth has been administrative law. The Federal
Court has a substantial administrative law work load in reviewing the decisions
of federal officials.3 This has of course lessened the review work of the
High Court which, it will be recalled," 4 has original jurisdiction to review
decisions of federal officers. An interesting aberration in this regard is the

§§ 82A-82-82C, §§ 84A-84C; and Disability DiscriminationAct 1992 (Cth) §§ 104A-C. On this
point, see also Brandy v. Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission, [19951 127

A.L.R. 1.
225. Exclusivejurisdictionunder the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) and other related
taxation statutes, was bestowed on the Federal Court by the Jurisdiction of Courts (Miscellaneous
Amendments) Act 1987 (Cth).
226. Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth).
227. This area is complex, but for an account of the court's jurisdiction see H.A.J. FORD &
R.P. AuSTIN, Principles of Company Law 882-87 (5th ed., 1990). For a brief description see
CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 154-55. See also Australian Sec. Comm'n v. Melbourne Assets
Management Nominees Pty. Ltd., 121 A.L.R. 626 (1994).
228. The two main sources of the court's power to review such decisions are the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) and the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) § 39B. From
September 1, 1994, however, its power to judicially review migration decisions was taken away
from the mainstream. The Federal Court's role in these cases is now defined exclusively by Part
8 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). See MARY E. CROCK, IMMIGRATION CONTROL AND THE
LAW IN AUSTRALIA, ch. 12 (Sydney: The Federation Press, forthcoming).
229. See, e.g., Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) § 44; Migration Act 1958
(Cth), § 475.
230. See CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 155-57.
231. See Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).
232. See Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) Part VI.
233. See, e.g., Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth).
234. See supra section IV.C.
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move in September 1994 to limit the role played by the Federal Court in the
judicial review of migration actions. This may result in a substantial rise in
the number of applications to review migration decisions made to the High
Court. 3 5
An additional reason that the Federal Court hears many matters is its
associate and accrued jurisdiction. This issue is fully covered in another paper
in this collection, 6 and all that need be written here is a brief summary.
Under section 32 of the Federal Court of Australia Act, the court can hear
associated matters under federal law which are otherwise outside its jurisdiction. 7 This associated jurisdiction is similar to the United States concept
of pendent jurisdiction. The court also possesses accrued jurisdiction. This
form of jurisdiction enables the Federal Court to hear a common-law claim
concurrently with a matter within its jurisdiction, provided the common-law
matter is an attached nonseverable claim. This issue first arose in Adamson
v. West Perth Football Club Inc. 8 in which Judge Northrop held that a
common-law restraint-of-trade action could be joined to a similar claim under
section 45 of the Trade Practices Act. 9 Both the Federal Cour 4 and the
High Court subsequently upheld this form of accrued jurisdiction.24 ' More
recently, the Federal Court has affirmed that it has accrued jurisdiction to deal
with a common-law claim, even if the matter within jurisdiction fails.242
Since July 1, 1988, cross-vesting legislation243 has minimized some of these
technical jurisdictional problems. The net result of the court's associated and
accrued jurisdiction is that the court has more than fifteen years experience in
hearing common-law claims which arise with matters within its jurisdiction.

235. See CROCK, supra note 228, at ch. 12.
236. Brian Opeskin, FederalJurisdictionin AustralianCourts:PoliciesandProspects,46 S.C.
L. REV. 765 (1995).
237. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) § 32(1). This associated jurisdiction has been
approved by the High Court. See, e.g., Philip Morris Inc. v. Adam P. Brown Male Fashions
Pty. Ltd., 148 C.L.R. 457 (1981).
238. 39 F.L.R. 199 (1979).
239. Id. at 211-24 (analyzing all previous High Court authorities). For comment and analysis,
see W.M.C. Gummow, Pendent Jurisdictionin Australia - Section 32 of the FederalCourt of
AustraliaAct 1976, 10 FED. L. REv. 211 (1979).
240. See, e.g., Gregory v. Philip Morris Ltd., 80 A.L.R. 455 (1988); Kennedy v. Australasian
Coal & Shale Employees Fed'n, 78 F.L.R. 252 (1983).
241. See, e.g., Fencott v. Muller, 152 C.L.R. 570 (1983); Philip Morris Inc. v. Adam P.
Brown Male Fashions Pty. Ltd., 148 C.L.R. 457 (1981).
242. Burgandy Royal Invs. Pty. Ltd. v. Westpac Banking Corp., 18 F.C.R. 212 (1988).
243. For commentaries on the cross-vesting scheme, see Johnson, supranote 6, at 70-91; Keith
Mason & James Crawford, The Cross-vestingScheme, 62 AuSTL. L.J. 328 (1988); see also Enid
M. Campbell, Cross-vestingof Jurisdictionin AdministrativeLaw Matters, 16 MONAsH L. REV.
1 (1990); Garrie Moloney, AIJA's Report on the Operationof the NationalScheme of Crossvesting of Jurisdiction,67 AUSTL. L.J. 289 (1993).
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The rise of the Federal Court is one of the more interesting aspects of the
history of the structure and growth of the Australian system of federal courts.
Indeed, the federal court has so altered the legal landscape that it is difficult
to imagine Australian law without it. To complete this discussion of these
federal courts, we turn finally to the Family Court of Australia.
VII. THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

A. Australian Divorce Law
Before the Creation of the Family Court
The development of family law in Australia was influenced strongly by
the beginnings of the colonies. For this reason, Australina family law's
history is even more curious than that of the equivalent English laws from
which it is derived.
In early 19th century Britain, authority for the annulment of a marriage
or for the release of parties from the bonds of matrimony was vested primarily
in the ecclesiastical courts. Full divorce was available to the very wealthy
through the passage of a private act of Parliament. 2' In the young Australian colonies, the ecclesiastical courts were never introduced and the Supreme
Courts were given no matrimonial jurisdiction.24 5 There was one attempt to
use the Parliamentary dissolution method, but this failed.246 Until the
colonies took up the English reforms in 1857, divorce was not available in
Australia.
The English Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857247 abolished the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts and conferred authority on a new Court of
Divorce and Matrimonial Causes to grant divorce to a husband on grounds of
adultery or to a wife on grounds of adultery and cruelty or other offense. The
various Australian colonies all adopted matrimonial causes legislation that
empowered their local supreme court to grant divorce by judicial decree. The
grounds for obtaining such an order, however, did not replicate the English
Act and were not uniform among the colonies.
The problems caused by the irregularity of the colonies' divorce laws
were well recognized by the framers of the Constitution. After vigorous
debate, it was felt that states' rights should yield to the desirability of one
uniform system of matrimonial law across the nation. 28 For this reason,
section 51(xxi) and (xxii) of the Australian Constitution gave the federal

244.
law).
245.
246.
247.
248.

See CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 214-16 (addressing the history of divorce under English
See Campbell, supra note 20, at 363-66.
See CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 215.
Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, 20 & 21 Vict., ch. 85 (U.K.).
See QUICK & GARRAN, supra note 68, at 608.
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Parliament power to legislate for marriage,249 divorce, parental rights, and
the custody and guardianship of infants."50 Curiously, the new federal
government did not move after 1901 to enact uniform family laws. The old
fault-based system continued with all its regional peculiarities until 1961.1
In 1961 the federal Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 2 came into force,
displacing the state laws but conferring federal jurisdiction on the state
supreme courts. These courts continued to exercise their state-based
jurisdiction in cases involving ex-nuptial children and de facto couples, two
areas not covered by the federal Constitution. The 1959 act provided for
divorce on fourteen grounds, most requiring the parties to demonstrate an
element of fault. The one important advance was the inclusion of separation
(for five and later three years) as such a ground.
Abandonment of fault as a basis for divorce did not occur until 1975,
when the Australian Parliament passed the Family Law Act.5 3 This legislation was visionary and revolutionary in the context of the preceding history of
family law in Australia. It is one of the more memorable changes made by the
Whitlam Labor government elected in 1972. The Act was the brainchild of
Senator Lionel Murphy, then attorney general, and later judge of the High
Court.
The Family Law Act 1975 established a single ground for the dissolution
of marriage: irretrievable breakdown of marriage, evidenced by one year's
separation. Fault in either party to a marriage was no longer relevant. The
Act established the Family Court to exercise the jurisdiction of the Act. The
federal matrimonial jurisdiction of the state supreme courts was phased out
everywhere but the Northern Territory.254
In 1987 the supreme courts' jurisdiction over ex-nuptial children and de
facto marriages also was transferred to the Family Court. This was done after
four of the states referred their powers to deal with these residual family law
matters to the Commonwealth Parliament."

249. AUSTL. CONST. § 51(xxi).
250. Id. § 51(xxii).
251. For critiques of the fault-based system, see, e.g., H.A. FINLAY & R.J. BAILEY-HARRIS,
FAMILY LAW INAUSTRALIA 14-16 (4th ed., 1989) and S. PARKER, ET AL., AUSTRALIAN FAMILY
LAW INCONTEXT, ch. 3 (1994).
252. Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 (Cth).
253. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

254. See CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 216-17.
255. See, e.g., Commonwealth Powers (Family Law - Children) Act 1986 (N.S.W.); see also
CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 222-23; FINLAY & BAILEY-HARRIS, supra note 251, at ch. 6.
Queensland referred its powers later. Western Australia has a Family Court that applies both
state and federal law.
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B. The Family Court of Australia
The Family Court of Australia is the largest superior court in Australia.
In September 1994, there were four judicial registrars and fifty-three judges
of whom the Chief Justice held a cross-appointment with the Federal Court.
As in other areas, the powers of the court have increased as the years have
passed as the result of judicial decisions and direct cooperative arrangements
between the Commonwealth and the states5

6

The Family Court Act 1975 does not confine its sphere of operation to
matters relating solely to divorce or separation proceedings. The 1975 Act
was passed in reliance on the divorce and the marriage powers in sections
51 (xxi) and (xxii) of the Constitution. This gave the court jurisdiction over
matters concerning maintenance and property of parties to a marriage and over
the custody of the children of a marriage, even when these were not ancillary
to divorce proceedings. The scheme of the Act was upheld by a bare majority
of the High Court in Russell v. Russell."57 The success of the legislation in
that case established for the federal Parliament the ability to pick and choose
between heads of constitutional power to circumvent limitations inherent in one
or the other."5 Between 1976 and 1987, other jurisdictional and constitutional difficulties for the court were resolved through amendments to the Act
and through cooperative arrangements with the states. 9
The Family Court has undergone some interesting procedural changes in
recent years. The court often is described as a "helping" court was designed
to be open, accessible, and nonintimidating to the parties. There is some
evidence that its creators wished it to be nonadversarial in operation.
However, the courts of review soon made it clear that the court should operate
in the adjudicative manner familiar in other curial jurisdictions. 2" The
judges of the Family Court certainly adopted a more relaxed style than was
common in other courts: judicial robes were not worn and counsel were not
required to be gowned. However, this experiment appears to have been a
failure. In 1988, robing was restored in the belief that the formal dress would
make litigants more respectful of the court and the orders it made.26'

256. For a history of the Family Court, see PARKER, supra note 251, at ch. 7 and P.
PARKINSON, TRADITION AND CHANGE IN AUSTRALIAN LAW 193 (1994).
257. 134 C.L.R. 495 (1976). The issue in that case related to the limiting phrase in § 51(xxii)
of the Constitution which gave the Commonwealth power to legislate for "[d]ivorce and
matrimonial causes; and in relation thereto, . . ." certain other matters. The argument was that
to use the unqualified marriage power to get around the restrictions of § 51(xxii), Parliament
would be rendering that placitum (and its restrictions) ineffective. Russell, 134 C.L.R. at 495.
258. For other examples establishing this ability, see supra section II.C.
259. See generally, CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 222.
260. See, e.g., the comments of the majorityjudges in The Queen v. Watson, 136 C.L.R. 248,
257-58 (1976) (per Barwick C.J., Gibbs, Stephen & Mason JJ.).
261. See Family Court of Australia (Additional Jurisdiction and Exercise of Powers) Act 1988
(Cth), § 30; CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 221.
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The work of the Family Court is concentrated in custody, maintenance,
and property disputes. Few divorces are contested, so proceedings for
principal relief take up little of the court's time.262 Custody actions now be
heard in Family Court whether they concern children of a marriage, ex nuptial
children, or even children whose actual parents are not the applicants in the
case. Recent changes in maintenance laws have resulted in a diversion in the
roles played by the court respecting parties to a marriage and children.
Children are covered by the Child Support Scheme introduced in 1989.263
This legislation relegates to the Family Court the role of reviewing26 assessments made by the Child Support Agency and certain other matters.
The most difficult area of the Family Court's jurisdiction, however,
continues to be that involving property disputes. The complexity of the area
is partly inherent and partly due to the lack of referral to the Commonwealth
of power over family property matters. Nevertheless, at least some of the
problems encountered in cases involving complex company directorships or
insolvency have been addressed through jurisdictional cross-vesting.265
VIII. THE FUTURE
The goal of this Paper has been to give an account of the development
and present features of the Australian federal courts. In writing especially for
a North American audience, it has been necessary to begin this description by
detailing the origins of Australian white settlement and of the development of
its legal institutions. In this preliminary portion of the Paper, we have also
spent a little time discussing the Australian Constitution. This supreme
document provides for the establishment of federal courts. It also delimits the
legislative powers of the federal and State governments. As these delimitations
govern the extent of federal law and hence the reach of the federal courts, we
have examined the manner in which the High Court has interpreted the
Constitution.
In the main body of the Paper, we have described the growth and
structure of four federal courts. The High Court of Australia sits at the apex
of the Australian judicial system and is the final court of appeal for Australia
and the guardian of the Constitution. When describing its structure and
growth, we have made the point that in recent years the High Court has shed
much of its original jurisdiction and routine appellate work and has focussed
upon being the final court of appeal on substantial questions of law and upon
its role as arbiter of the Constitution. It is likely that in the immediate future

262. See CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 222.
263. Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth); see also A. Lanteri, Child Support
Assessment: Reviews by the Court, 5 A. J. FAM. L. 120 (1991).
264. See Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) §§ 99-105.
265. See generally CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 224-26.
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the High Court will continue down this path with the possible exception of
cases involving the review of migration decisions. 2"
Labor courts also have been a feature of our federal court structure since
the turn of the century. Their presence bespeaks much about Australia's
preoccupations with industrial disputes and the respective roles of capital and
labor in the nation. Over the last ninety years, there have been several labor
court structures, with the greatest changes occurring in the mid-1950s, when
the Boilennakers' doctrine caused a separation between federal courts and
administrative tribunals. The present labor court is the Industrial Relations
Court, which has had vested in it new jurisdiction consonant with the
enactment of recent reforming labor legislation. Whether this court remains
intact in the coming years or whether this jurisdiction is once again given to
the Federal Court of Australia is very much a political question. In any event,
it is clear that jurisdiction over labor relations will continue to occupy much
of the time of the Australian federal court system.
Perhaps the most startling change to Australia's federal court structure
occurred in 1977 when the Federal Court of Australia commenced operations.
After a long period of gestation, this court has become the second most
important curial body in the nation, surpassed only by the High Court. Its
breadth of jurisdiction and the impact of its decisions have altered Australia's
legal landscape. In the immediate future, legal life would be unthinkable
without a significant federal presence in the form of the Federal Court of
Australia. It may be that the court will be restructured in some way, but there
is no doubt that federal judges will continue to undertake a substantial amount
of legal decision-making, one rung below the High Court of Australia.
We concluded this study by writing a few words on the Family Court of
Australia, which is our largest superior federal court. Given the federal and
state cooperation in this area, it appears that this court will have a secure place
in our federal court structure for many years to come. More than any other
federal court, its decisions affect the lives of many Australian couples and their
children.
Any study of the Australian system of federal courts of this length can
only be preliminary in nature. Nevertheless, we hope that it will have given
readers a foundation from which to view the jurisdictional issues that confront
our network of federal and state courts.

266. By redefining and restricting access to the Federal Court in these cases, amendments to
the Migration Act 1958 in September 1994 are expected to force a substantial number of
disgruntled applicants to seek redress in the High Court. See CROCK, supra note 228, at ch. 12.
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